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Foreword 
Once again, energy has become the focus of many national and international studies. But instead 
of concentrating on the energy resources and their depletion, which was the main point of the 
energy-related studies following the energy crises in the 19708, the scope and direction of the long- 
term energy research activities is presently determined by climatic changes and risks to  mankind 
and environment associated with the operation of energy systems. There are many uncertainties 
related to  this problem, from energy demand assessments, especially in the developing world, to 
the rate of restructuring energy supply in view of the pressing necessity to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions to  mitigate or postpone future climatic changes. Available results in this area 
obtained elsewhere are still inconsistent, incomparable and hardly justified; and there is no clear 
understanding on how to combine the needs for improving life standards in the developing world 
with an increasing population and the inevitable growth of energy demand. This is the reason 
why IIASA recently resumed the energy research activity with a major emphasis on climatic 
changes and possible measures towards low-emission energy systems. 
This working paper contains first results of IIASA's approach to solving the problem. The 
paper demonstrates the impact of different strategies with regard to the energy-economy devel- 
opment and the reshaping of the global energy system to reduce C 0 2  emissions until the middle 
of the next century. The author shows that, in order to alleviate the negative impacts of energy 
systems on the climate, it will be necessary to undertake tremendous efforts to improve the en- 
ergy use efficiency, to drastically change the primary energy mix, and, a t  the same time, to take 
action to reduce greenhouse emissions from other sources and increase the C 0 2  sink through 
enhanced reforestation. The paper stresses once more the utmost importance of treating climate 
changes as a genuinely global problem, whose resolution requires international cooperation. 
Bo R. Diiijs 
Acting Program Leader 
Climate and Ecology Related Energy Program 
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Global Energy/C02 Projections 
1 Social and Economic Problems of the 21st Century and the 
Role of Energy Supply Systems 
On the eve of the 21st century, world society is trying to formulate with hope and care the 
long-term features of its future. The main reasons for this are the growing crisis in interrelations 
between man and his environment, the increasing polarization of rich and poor countries, and 
the rethinking and reevaluations of uses and abuses of technological progress. We are entering 
the next century with many problems. Several of these problems can be only vaguely outlined 
now, and their impacts are still uncertain; but others have surfaced and demand immediate 
actions. Ways of coping with some of these difficulties are known, but for others it is necessary 
to  undertake intensive studies with the collaborative efforts of many countries at different social 
and economic development levels and with different political systems. One thing is evident now: 
collaboration of all nations is the actual measure for mankind's safety. The complexity of most 
of the new problems increases a t  fast speed, which could only be compared with the speed of 
technological progress itself (if not faster!). Many of the problems arise simultaneously and 
amplify each other, thereby producing new difficulties and new problems. 
Under these circumstances, the role of forecasting must be emphasized as the scientific 
approach t o  select the most important links between society and environment that demand 
special attention and collective study. Forecasts have not always been successful. However, in 
many cases preventive measures based on successful projections have been undertaken to  avoid 
catastrophes or severe shocks on the national or international scene. These actions justify the 
usefulness and even the necessity of forecasting approaches in many spheres of human activities. 
Forecasting methods are being constantly improved; mankind learns by its mistakes. Successful 
forecasting remains to  be a kind of art and completely depends on the background and outlook 
of the experts engaged in the activity. Therefore, the application of more than one approach in 
the elaboration of forecasts must be a main principle in forecasting. 
We are not going to  investigate here all the problems of mankind in the next century. We 
will only try to list several of them and show where energy problems are placed on this list 
against the background of contradictions and difficulties that will be characteristic of the next 
century. Global goals (or ideals!) for the next century could be briefly summarized as follows: 
A safe natural environment by reducing anthropogenic impacts. 
Development of poor countries with the aim a t  reducing the gap between developed and 
developing countries in their approach to  and use of material and humanitarian values 
achieved by mankind. This process should be intensified with industrialized countries 
playing an active role and, based on new technological concepts, guaranteeing a safe envi- 
ronment and the continued existence of mankind. 
Peaceful d s t e n c e  and collaboration of states with different political systems, religions, 
cultures, and histories. 
Global disarmament and an alternative to war as a method of solving disputes between 
nations. 
These goals will be difficult to  achieve. Nevertheless, they outline the initial assumptions 
(optimistic in their matter) that will likely specify the background of global development over 
the next decades. 
The successful solution of global problems is unlikely without a favorable political climate; 
removal of all local and global military conflicts; creation of new economic relations provid- 
ing efficient collaboration of developed and developing countries in solving regional and global 
problems; and further improvements in democratic forms of government. 
The role of moral and ethic principles will slowly increase [I] and be reflected in the following: 
Improving the intellectual potential of society. 
Eliminating all forms of national and religious contradictions; removal of genocide, racism, 
and nationalism. 
Enhancing national cultures. 
Raising the intellectual level of mankind, and providing all members of the society with 
equal rights to  education. 
Developing a broad-scale humanitarian approach to solving social, economic, and envi- 
ronmental problems including the ethics of refusals and satisfying reasonable needs for 
material consumption. 
Reducing various forms of egotistical viewpoints, especially in solving social and ecological 
problems. 
Technological progress will keep its leading role in social and economic development but will 
be governed by the following general principles: 
Humanization of technologies, technological concepts, and technical education. 
Safety criteria as major parameters in the research and design of new technologies and 
industries. 
Increases in life expectancy of humans and improvements in mankind's genotype. 
Abolishment of hunger and supplying the world population with high-quality food stuffs. 
Conservation of material resources use. 
Creation of new materials capable of supporting technological progress in the next century. 
Penetration of new spaces (e.g., oceans and cosmos); 
F'rom this viewpoint some new areas of technological progress will change our understanding 
of the industrial potential and structures in the next century (and will probably produce new 
environmental, moral, and ethical problems). These areas include: 
New materials: composite and ceramic. 
Genetic engineering and biotechnology. 
Micre and optic- electronics. 
Nuclear fusion. 
Fine films and membranes. 
As can be seen from this list (far from being complete and reflecting the author's subjective 
viewpoint), energy related problems, though not dominant, will continue t o  be among the high- 
priority global problems. 
Energy is the essential element of mankind's existence and the moving force of all material 
culture. However, it is quite reasonable t o  assume that after reaching some level of material 
culture its role in social and educational progress will begin t o  decline giving superiority t o  
humanitarian values. If this assumption is true, then a future gap between the growth rates of 
economy and energy demand will be justified. This trend has occurred in many highly developed 
countries during the 1980s and undoubtedly will continue over the next century (especially if 
it is stimulated by active government policies aimed at  abating local and global environmental 
disruptions). Economic development a t  a stable (or even declining) energy consumption level 
is likely to  be reality in the near future. This phenomenon will remove Bome stress from the 
global energy scene. On the other hand, there are several new energy technologies that already 
exist or are known in principle and could supply mankind with practically inexhaustible energy 
resources. Much depends on the costs of these technologies (as compared with existing ones), 
their development lead time, and their penetration. It is clear now that the exhaustion of cheap 
conventional energy resources will lead t o  the wide application of new energy technologies relying 
on abundant and inexhaustible energy sources. All this gives hope that mankind will not perish 
because of a lack of energy sources. 
The real problem is how to  provide further global energy systems development without 
additional burdens to  the economy and the environment as well as with less risks t o  humanity 
and the biosphere. The leading principle in solving this problem is based on the introduction of 
the social cost appnmch for substantiating energy systems development and the choice of proper 
energy technologies. Social costs incorporate all costs and investments made during the lifetime 
of a technology and all direct and indirect costs associated with its impacts on human health, 
the biosphere, and climate. Only such a broad methodological concept, based on social cost 
assessments, is applicable in solving long-term energy problems. 
The global situation of energy systems worldwide on the eve of the 21st century can be 
summarized as follows: 
Mankind makes its first steps toward the transition period from energy systems based on 
exhaustible fossil fuel resources t o  practically inexhaustible energy sources (e.g., fission 
and fusion, renewable energy resources). 
Ecological and safety aspects will be the main points of all future energy systems devel- 
opment concepts. 
Global energy demand is likely t o  continue t o  grow during the next century (at least 
during the first half) because of increasing population and further development of material 
production in developing countries, though energy demand growth will be much slower 
than in the past because of energy-savings and conservation measures a t  all stages of the 
energy flow from production to  end-use. Energy demand growth will soon stabilize (at the 
end of the next century) a t  a level three t o  six times higher than that of today's. 
In case of expected relatively low energy demand growth rates, fossil fuel resources a t  any 
rate (even hydrocarbons) will play a leading role in energy supply until the middle of the 
next century. 
Renewable energy sources will hardly play a remarkable role in the world energy balance 
because of their low density and high costs except in countries with more favorable con- 
ditions, where this type of energy will be able t o  cover local energy needs. (The situation 
might change, of course, if fossil fuel use is limited because of climatic changes and if 
new technological breakthroughs and improvements in the safety of nuclear reactors are 
achieved.) 
Capital intensities of energy supply will increase but will keep the share of energy systems 
in total investments at  a constant level (or even decline in the future), which will justify 
the needs for further intense efforts in energy savings and the transition to cheaper energy 
carriers. (This tendency will become more important as ecological requirements for energy 
technologies grow. ) 
In total, the global energy situation during the next century will not be critical if we follow 
a rwrsonable long-term etmtqy for energy systems development. However, to  escape critical 
situations in the future, i t  will be necessary to find new concepts of energy development that, 
on a broader scale, take into account social, economic, and environmental impacts of energy 
development. 
2 Energy-Environment Interactions as a Central Point of 
Energy Research Activities 
The negative impacts depend on the energy production scale, which is followed by large amounts 
of waste (often toxic), e.g., flue gases and waste water. Toxic substances through migration of 
natural circulation of matter and energy enter trophic chains; accumulate in soil and species; 
reduce agricultural, forestry, and fishery production; speed up corrosion processes; and destroy 
buildings and landscapes. Air pollution and the declining quality of foodstuffs have negative 
impacts on human health and productivity. Microflora of natural biocenoses, which are responsi- 
ble for self-cleaning of the environment, can transform into hostile (sometimes even pathogenic) 
agents in the natural system. 
The reduction of toxic substances in waste water to  the permissible level demands large 
quantities of fresh water (often ten or even one hundred times more than the volume of waste 
water). This action could results in the exhaustion of fresh-water resources, therefore it is not 
an adequate solution. The problem has to be solved at the sources where the pollutants are 
formed. 
The following example illustrates the negative impacts energy systems have on the envi- 
ronment in the USSR. Air pollutants released into the atmosphere by these systems amount 
to  100-120 million tons of chemical substances per year, including 20 million tons of fly ash 
and soot, 40 million tons of carbon dioxide, 30 million tons of sulfur dioxide, 20 million tons of 
hydrocarbons, and 10 million tons of nitrogen oxides. 
About 40 million tons of toxic pollutants (mainly hydrocarbons and NO,) are generated by 
automobiles; with the high share of automobiles in large cities, this creates especially dangerous 
ground-layer concentrations of toxic pollutants. Hundreds of cities have pollutant concentrations 
higher than permissible national standards. 
Thermal power plants release 2 million tons of salt and chemical components per year and 
produce 2 t o  3 cubic kilometers of waste water (part of which contains oil products), requiring 
10 to 20 times more fresh water t o  dilute to  standard levels. The construction of hydroelectric 
stations was accompanied by the reduction of several million hectares of productive agricultural 
lands, unrecoverable damage to  fishery, degradation of living conditions of many rivers, and 
change in the landscape of vast territories. 
Fossil fuels production causes extensive damage to  the environment (e.g., in the northern part 
of the Tjumen region, the total cumulative damage from crude oil and natural gas production and 
transportation over the past 25 years is estimated to  be more than 40 billion rubles; in regions 
with coal surface mining, such as Kuzbass or Ekubastuz, millions of hectares of agricultural land 
became unusable). 
Nuclear energy's safety has reached a critical level, which makes further development doubtful 
in many regions of the USSR as well as in other countries. According to  some findings, economic 
damages from environmental pollution caused by energy systems are severalfold that of fuel 
market prices (in large cities it is even five to tenfold), which is practically not taken into account 
when developing energy policies or deciding on technologial concepts for energy developments. 
In total, the acute ecological situation common in the USSR is typical for several other 
nations. In spite of successes in environmental protection achieved by some developed countries, 
the global ecological situation is growing worse. 
Atmospheric carbon dioxide is the major contributor to radiative forcing [55% in the mid- 
1980s and approximately two-thirds in the long-term perspective after the banning of chloroflu- 
orocarbons (CFCs)]. According to rough estimates, during the last 100-120 years more than 
200 billion tons of anthropogenic carbon (or 700 billion tons of carbon dioxide) were released 
into the atmosphere, of which two-thirds are the result of industrial activity - i.e., by burning 
of fossil fuels. 
The energy sector, which generates 46% of the present greenhouse-effect gases, will keep its 
leading role in the future, increasing its share to 65% according to the IPCC (1990). Studies 
investigating the consequences of greenhouse-gas concentrations in the atmosphere predict an 
increase in surface air temperatures by 3f 1.5OC for a doubling of the "equivalentn atmospheric 
concentrations of COz. Climate changes in the polar region could be three to four times higher 
compared with the average of the planet. In moderate latitudes the increase could be two- 
to threefold. Global warming will increase evaporation, which results in increased water-vapor 
content and enhances the greenhouse effect because water vapor actively absorbs long-wave 
radiation. On the other hand, increasing water vapor in the atmosphere will cause the opposite 
effect because of increased cloudiness that is followed by the albedo's change and thus reduces the 
global warming. But the increase in global warming is definitly expected to be the predominant 
process. Anthropogenic trace gases such as NzO, CH4, and CFCs could also affect global 
warming because many absorb reflected radiation at a wave length of 8-12 pm. Because of 
the higher annual growth rates of emission for other greenhouse gases, global warming could 
occur earlier than calculated on the basis of energy projections. 
The changed radiation balance will not only result in a global warming. Largescale precip- 
itation pattern will also be modified implying consequences for human activities (agriculture, 
forestry, and water-resource management). The agricultural zones in the Northern Hemisphere 
will shift north, which could be followed by the reduction of agricultural product yields b e  
cause of the precipitation reduction in steppe and forest-steppe zones, i.e., in zones with highly 
productive soils. 
Global warming will inevitably increase sea level, because of both melting of glaciers and the 
expanding of ocean water. The Arctic ice cover will reduce, although it might initially increase 
in thickness. The sea level will ultimately go up by 35-65 cm (IPCC, 1990). To overcome these 
negative impacts will require worldwide efforts. 
It is evident now that the ultimate solution of global environmental problems at all levels 
is impossible without introducing energy technologies that are more environmentally benign - 
presently this is not accounted for in long-term energy programs. This could be accomplished 
with understanding of the importance of this policy from the public, the scientific community, 
and decision makers. Such a policy would call for new construction work with short pay-back 
periods, which is due to a large reduction in the environmental and human health losses (calcu- 
lating the pay-back time on the basis of the social cost concept). Efforts must be made to assess 
environmental losses (locally and globally, short and long term) and, even more important, to 
supplement these calculations with reliable ecological and climatic information. When choosing 
new energy technologies or defining strategies for energy systems development, it is necessary 
to compare the additional pollution abatement costs with the reduction in damages due to the 
abatement. Such an approach of assigning a priority index to all abatement measures, based on a 
cost-benefit analysis, could provide effective environmental programs and minimize the negative 
consequences of global warming. This new element in global energy studies requires detailed 
investigation on a broad, international basis and the approval of different scientific institutions. 
3 New Ways of Technological Progress and its Impacts 
on Energy Demand and Supply 
The achieved levels of social and economic progress are characterized by the increasing role 
science plays as a driving force of changes taking place in society and its relations to  the envi- 
ronment. This tendency appeared recently, and will demonstrate its forms and efficiencies in the 
years to  come. At the same time scientific activities, with positive as well as negative impacts on 
civilization, will be analyzed from a viewpoint of more rigid requirements and constraints based 
on social, ecological, safety, and economic criteria. The ethics of responsibility for mankind's 
fate will play a growing role when solving the increasing number of technological problems. 
As stressed above, the role of material production will remain predominant in global social 
and economic developments, though its importance will systematically decline. This means that 
technological progress takes place first of all in the field of material production, where its impact 
has the largest efficiency. But in time, the importance of nonmaterial spheres of societal life will 
steadily rise, providing changes in lifestyles. 
Mankind should try to aquire a new concept of material production development, which 
features the following: 
Ecology and safety of new technologies and products. 
Social cost effectiveness. 
Miniaturization of product goods. 
Material and energy savings at  production and consumption levels. 
Respect for national and local features, traditions, culture and religion when choosing new 
technologies and material concepts. 
Concerns about the impacts of long-term concepts and projections on today's solutions. 
These requirements will have to  be included in new energy concepts and technologies when 
elaborating long-term energy projections at  global and regional levels. One thing is certainly 
clear: the application of these approaches to material production systems (including energy 
systems) requires less energy per unit of goods or services produced by society and will further 
increase the gap between economic and energy demand trends. 
4 Long-Term Global Energy Projections 
4.1 Background 
The main goal of long-term forecasting of social and economic events, such as energy projections, 
is not to  define the accurate quantitative values of different factors characterizing the state of 
the art of the system under consideration. Rather it is to clarify principal trends and tendencies 
that will dominate over the projected period and that may bring about new and unforeseen 
difficulties and problems capable of changing the flow of progress. Long-term energy projections 
can have different intentions. Of most interest to  us are the problems of exhausting cheap 
fossil fuel resources and the impacts of air pollution on the climate, caused by different energy 
consumers and energy systems as a whole. 
The most promising approach t o  long-term projections is based on the simulation of the world 
energy system in its development and restructure. Such an approach provides the possibility 
for evaluating the prospected outcomes of systems development under different sets of input 
hypothesis and data. Scenario projections also have a few drawbacks, one of which is the 
subjective judgment resulting from the philosophies of the author. From this viewpoint, the 
projections in this paper might also suffer from a similar "disease." 
Correct, long-term projections - especially for complex systems in social, economic, and 
technical areas - are rare. The selection of experts for the projection process has to  be done 
with great care. Of course, this is often very difficult to fulfill and does not, however, imply 
the usefulness of long-term projections at  all. On the contrary, even odd projections could play 
a positive role (for example, as a learning step to the next ones). Post-analyses of long-term 
projections lead to  improvements in the way of thinking, the methodologies used, etc., and to  
more efficient future projections. 
The main trends and tendencies of energy systems worldwide, briefly analyzed above, are 
used implicitly for the long-term energy demand projections given below. Energy demand is 
assessed with the help of a simplified model, calculating demand as a function of GNP growth 
rates and energy/GNP elasticities. The share of electricity generation in primary energy is 
evaluated on the basis of past experience and future aasumptions of the role of electricity and 
electrification in the social and economic development of regions. To convert primary energy 
into electrical units, we used specific fuel consumption assessments for the generation of 1 k w h  
a t  thermal power plants, taking into account different technical levels of electricity generation 
systems in developed and developing countries and expected technological progress in the area 
of consideration. As energy projection output indicators we specified some relative values (e.g., 
energy consumption per capita and per unit of GNP), which are analyzed over the time period 
or between regions t o  establish an accurate projection procedure. 
If there is a strong fluctuation in output indicators or if they are incompatible with ini- 
tial assumptions or judgments, then new iterations will be made until the output indicators 
reach "reasonablen levels. However, it is again quite evident that these "reasonablen levels are 
highly dependent on the persons engaged in the projection activity. This is one reason for the 
subjective character of conclusions and findings of this study as well as all studies based on 
a scenario approach. The projections described below are based on "moderately conservative 
viewsn concerning changes in economies and energy systems. This means that in real life the 
changes might be much larger and faster and will result in more changes in energy supply and 
demand as compared with those assumed in this study. 
The energy projections are carried out for the major regions of the world as determined by 
the World Energy Conference. All socialist countries, including China, are considered as one 
region. For all regions we assessed expected levels of total primary energy demand and electricity 
generation. Fossil fuel production by fuel types and generation of other forms of primary energy 
(nuclear, hydro, and other renewables) are evaluated for the world as a whole. 
The total time period under consideration is split into two sub-periods: 1990-2020, with 
10-year intervals, and 2020-2060, with two 20-year intervals. 
The demographic projections are considered to  be the most important factor for energy 
forecasts. The trend of world population is difficult to  forecast. According to  many assessments, 
world population will reach over 6 billion by the beginning of the next century. It is evident 
that nowadays the world population growth rate is declining. The highest population growth 
rate was during the period 1970-1980, when the annual average growth rate was equal to  1.95% 
for the world as a whole and 2.37% for developing countries. During the next five-year period it 
declined to 1.7% for the world, and was equal to  2.9% for Africa, 1.7% for Asia, 0.9% for North 
America, and only 0.3% for Europe. 
At the start of the 21st century, the world average population growth rate is likely to  be 
1.44% (0.53% for developed and 1.72% for developing countries). The population of Africa and 
Latin America will have the highest growth rates. On the other hand, the majority of West 
European and North American nations will notice a stabilization in population growth. World 
population by the year 2025 is expected to  reach 8 billion. According to  many world/regional 
demographic assessments, world population will continue to increase until the end of the next 
century and then will stabilize a t  the level of 10 to  12 billion; the stabilization of population 
growth in developed countries will be much earlier (e.g., "zero growthn in the USA could be a 
reality by 2030-2040 and in Western Europe in the first quarter of the next century). 
The share of the population not living in rural areas or settlements will continue to increase 
and by 2000 half the world population is likely to live in cities (this share will be even higher 
in developed countries, 78% for Europe and 83% for Australia and Oceania). By the year 
2025, two-thirds of the world's population will live in cities that will be characterized by life- 
styles and patterns of energy consumption. First of all, this trend will result in a further 
strong reduction in noncommercial fuel consumption (fuelwood, charcoal, dung, etc.) and in 
the expansion of centralized energy supply systems (electricity and heat supply grids, oil and 
gas pipeline networks) with higher energy efficiency, more flexibility and reliability, and higher 
costs. 
The regional economic development growth rates are exogenous, using assumptions about 
the social progress and economic basis of regions with different economic development levels. 
The concept of GNP per capita stabilization is applied to  developed countries; this means that 
after reaching a certain level (of course, much higher than today's), the GNP per capita remains 
almost unchanged over a long period. 
Other input parameters are evaluated on the basis of expected economic and energy systems 
parameters of different regions. The quantitative parameters used in the model are summarized 
in Table 1. 
Two major factors for scenario elaboration are selected which are extremely important for 
future energy demand projections: 
Energy conservation policy (mudemte, under prevailing implementation of market forces 
for reconstruction of energy systems; enhanced, with the support of the government and 
special incentive regulations). 
Rates and ways of changing the primary energy mix (refers to nuclear energy and fossil fuel 
production, in particular to natural gas, in view of environmental and climatic changes). 
As a result the following scenarios and options within the scenarios are chosen for consideration: 
Base Case, Scenario A 
A1 Business-as-usual (with normal technological progress in energy systems without 
special constraints on levels and structures of primary energy production); energy 
conservation is controlled only by market forces. 
A2 The same as in A1 but with a nuclear moratorium after 2010 (after this time the 
share of nuclear energy is assumed to stabilize at the achieved level until 2060). 
A3 The same as in A1 but with a nuclear reduction after 2010 (practically stop nuclear 
energy production until 2060). 
A4 The same as in A1 but with limited fossil fuels use starting a t  2010 ( "greenhosue 
abatement optionn). 
Enhanced Eneryy-Saving, Scenario B 
B1 Economic and social development is carried out under special state regulations to 
support enhanced energy savings, no special limitations for the primary energy mix. 
B2 The same as in B1 but with a nuclear moratorium after 2010. 
B3 The same as in B1 but with a nuclear energy reduction after 2010. 
B4 The same as in B1 but with limited fossil fuels use after 2010. 
'hble 1: Input data for the global energy lcenarios 
A )  Base Scenario 
................................................................. 
Regions Units 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2060 
North America 
Population mln. 248 274 296 315 330 336 340 
GNP annual growth %/yr 3.03 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.8 0.5 
Energy/GNP 
elasticity % 0.260.250.2 0.1 0 -0.1-0.5 
Electricity share % 32 35 38 45 50 52 55 
Western Europe 
Population mln. 
GNP annual growth %/yr 2.97 2.5 2.5 2 1 1 0.5 
Energy/GNP 
elasticity % 0.61 0.35 0.25 0.2 0.1 0 -0.5 
Electricity share % 39.845 50 55 60 65 65 
Pacific Region 
Population mln. 135 143 151 154 156 157 157 
GNP annual growth %/yr 4.6 4 3.5 2.5 1 0 0 
Energy/GNP 
elasticity % 0.61 0.35 0.2 0.1 0 -0.2 -0.6 
Electricity share % 43 47 52 57 65 67 68 
North Africa and Middle East 
Population mln. 158 212 245 275 300 320 335 
GNP annual growth %/yr 4 4 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.2 
Energy/GNP 
elasticity % 1.17 1.1 1.1 1 0.9 0.7 0.5 
Electricity share % 29 32 36 45 50 55 60 
Africa south to Sahara 
Population mln. 361 490 667 880 1245 1300 1350 
GNP annual growth %/yr 4.05 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Energy/GNP 
elasticity % 1.39 1.3 1.25 1.2 1.1 1 0.9 
Electricity share % 52 50 48 45 40 45 50 
South Asia 
Po~ulation mln. 
GNP annual growth %/yr 3.44 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Energy/GNP 
elasticity % 1.83 1.5 .4 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.7 
Electricity share % 42 42 45 47 49 50 50 
South-East Asia 
Population mln. 343 417 498 550 637 700 740 
GNP annual growth %/yr 7.1 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Energy/GNP 
elasticity % 1.28 1.25 1.2 1.1 1 0.9 0.7 
Electricity share % 33 35 37 40 42 44 46 
Latin America 
Population mln. 364 480 625 820 960 1080 1220 
GNP annual growth %/yr 6.16 4 4 4 4 3.5 3.5 
Energy/GNP 
elasticity % 1.06 1.05 1 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.4 
Electricity share % 37 40 42 45 50 55 60 
Socialist Countries 
Population mln. 
GNP annual growth %/yr 6.2 5 4 4 4 4 3.5 
Energy/GNP 
elasticity % 1.06 0.75 0.65 0.5 0.35 0.2 0.05 
Electricity share % 28 31 35 38 42 47 53 
................................................................. 
Note: Electricity share is given as the ratio of primary energy 
consumed for electricity generation in total primary energy 
demand; nuclear, hydro and other renewable electricity as well as 
electiricty import are expressed as replacement of fossil fuels 
at thermal power plants. 
B) Enhanced Energy Saving Scenario 
................................................................. 
Regions Units 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2060 
North America 
Population mln. 248 274 296 315 330 336 340 
GNP annual growth %/yr 3.03 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.8 0.5 
Energy/GNP 
elasticity % 0.26 0.2 0.1 0 -0.1 -0.25 -0.65 
Electricity share % 32 35 38 45 50 52 55 
Western Europe 
Population mln. 
GNP annual growth %/yr 2.97 2.5 2.5 2 1 1 0.5 
Energy/GNP 
elasticity % 0.61 0.35 0.2 0.1 0 -0.15 -0.75 
Electricity share % 40 45 48 52 55 65 65 
Pacific Region 
Population mln. 135 143 151 154 156 157 157 
GNP annual growth %/yr 4.62 4 3.5 2.5 1 0 0 
Energy/GNP 
elasticity % 0.61 0.3 0.1 0 -0.1 -0.5 -0.75 
Electricity share % 43 47 52 57 65 67 68 
North Africa and Middle East 
Population mln. 158 212 245 275 300 320 335 
GNP annual growth %/yr 4 4 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.2 
Energy/GNP 
elasticity % 1.17 1.1 1.1 0.85 0.7 0.5 0.3 
Electricity share % 29 32 36 45 50 55 60 
Africa south to Sahara 
Po~ulation mln. 
GNP annual growth %/yr 4.05 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Energy/GNP 
elasticity % 1.39 1.3 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.5 
Electricity share % 52 50 48 45 40 45 50 
South Asia 
Po~ulation mln. GNP annual growth %/yr 3.44 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Energy/GNP 
elasticity % 1.83 1.5 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.45 
Electricity share % 42 42 45 47 49 50 50 
South-East Asia 
Po~ulation mln. GNP annual growth %/yr 7.1 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Energy/GNP 
elasticity % 1.28 1.25 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.25 
Electricity share % 33 35 37 40 42 44 46 
Latin America 
Population mln. 364 480 625 820 960 1080 1220 
GNP annual growth %/yr 6.16 4 4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Energy/GNP 
elasticity % 1.06 1.05 1 0.8 0.65 0.4 0.2 
Electricity share % 37 40 42 45 50 55 60 
Socialist Countries 
Population mln. 1451 1650 1810 1930 2050 2100 2120 
GNP annual growth %/yr 6.2 5 4 4 4 4 3.5 
Energy/GNP 
elasticity % 1.06 0.75 0.6 0.35 0.2 0.05 0 
Electricity share % 28 31 35 38 42 47 53 
Note: Electricity share is given as the ratio of primary energy 
consumed for electricity generation in total primary energy 
demand; nuclear, hydro and other renewable electricity as well as 
electiricty import are expressed as replacement of fossil fuels 
at thermal power plants. 
4.2 Social and Economic Progress Worldwide 
Global long-term projections of social and economic developments are shown in Table 2. Under 
given assumptions chances are slim that, with present and expected rates of social/econornic 
progress, the main global problems could be successfully solved during the period from 1990 to  
2060 (in particular, for example, narrowing the gap in GNP per capita between developed and 
developing countries). This gap reaches $8,000-$10,000 now and will increase from 1990 to  2060. 
The situation in Africa (south of the Sahara) and in South Asia, with a high rate of population 
growth, will be especially tragic; the standard of living in these regions is expected to  increase 
by 2060, but it will remain several times lower than it is in today's developed countries. The 
economic development of new industrialized regions such as North Africa, the Middle East, or 
Latin America will be much more favorable, and a per capita level of $3,000 is feasible by the 
year 2000, which is considered the initial level of industrially developed countries. In the next 
century, these regions could remarkably reduce the gap in social and economic development. In 
summary, the GNP per capita gap between developed and developing countries will decrease 
from the present factor of about ten to  four, though in absolute terms the lagging behind 
of developing countries will probably even increase. The social and economic development of 
socialist countries as a whole will continue with moderate growth rates, and the GNP per capita 
gap between developed and socialist countries could be reduced to  a factor of two until 2060. At 
the same time, East European countries and the USSR might reach or come close to the level 
of developed countries, although Asian countries (in particular, China) will remain far behind 
developed countries if no special measures are undertaken to  enhance the economic and social 
development of these developing countries. 
4.3 World Energy Demand Projections 
The results of long-term global/regional energy-demand modeling are summarized in Table 3. 
The main conclusions of the long-term projections for the next 50 to  70 years are as follows: 
Global primary energy demand will increase but with lower growth rates than for GNP. 
At GNP growth rates of 1.85 in 2000, compared with 1980 rates of 1.6 in 2000-2020 and of 
2.5 in 2020-2060, the total energy demand will grow only 1.5 times until 2000; 1.25-1.40 
times in 2000-2020; and 1.25-1.75 times in 2020-2060, i.e., the GNP/energy elasticity will 
be much lower than during the past 30-40 years. Global energy demand will likely reach 
20 to  30 billion tce/yr until the end of the projection period (depending on the efforts and 
efficiencies of global and national energy conservation policies). This level turns out to  be 
remarkably lower than predicted in the early 1980s (including the projections published 
by the Working Consulting Group of the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences). 
The tendency of energy projections to go down follows from the energy conservation path 
of economic development, which recently has become the focus of the majority of national 
energy programs, despite stable energy prices at  lower levels. This global policy will be 
achieved in various ways and with different efficiencies, depending on the scope of national 
energy efforts. 
Global energy demand growth will take place, first, because of the inability of developing 
and socialist countries to  solve internal social and economic problems without increased 
energy consumption.[2] As a result, the developed countries' share in global energy d e  
mand will decrease from today's 52% to 38% in 2000 and to  only 15%-20% in 2060. The 
developing countries' share will grow fast: from 11% in 1980 to 18% in 2000 and over 40% 
in 2060. The share of socialist countries is likely to  remain almost at  the same level (it 
will increase from 37% in 1989 to 44% in 2000 and will go down to 33%-37% in 2060). 
Such fast changes in global energy demand over several decades will shift the weight of 
global energy problems from developed to developing countries and could produce new 
a b l e  2: Ileeults of eeonomic m d  energy projections. 
A) Base Scenario 
................................................................. 
Regions Actual data Projections 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2060 
North America 
10A3 $(GNP)/cap. 7.2 9.4 11.6 13.5 15.2 16.6 17.5 20 22 
t c.e./cap. 7.810.8 10.6 10.2 9.8 9.4 8.9 8.6 8.1 
10-3 kWh/cap. 4.7 7.2 9.5 10.8 12.0 14.0 16.0 17.5 17 
tc.e./10A3$(GNP) 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 
kwh/$ (GNP) 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 
Western Europe 
10-3 $(GNP)/cap. 4.7 6.9 8.6 10.5 12.8 15.0 16.2 20 22 
t c.e./cap. 2.2 3.4 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.8 
10A3 kWh/cap. 1.7 3.0 4.3 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.5 9.0 
tc.e./10A3 $(GNP) 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 
kwh/$ (GNP) 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 
Pacific Region 
10A3 $(GNP)/cav. 2.8 6.4 9.0 12.5 16.7 21.0 23.0 23 23 
t c.e./cap. 1.3 3.3 3.9 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.1 3.6 
10A3 kWh/cap. 1.4 3.6 5.2 5.7 6.8 7.9 9.310.2 9.1 
t c.e./10A3 $(GNP) 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
kwh/$ (GNP) 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 
North Africa and Middle East 
10A3 $(GNP)/cap. 1.1 2.1 3.1 3.4 4.1 4.7 5.5 8 12 
t c.e./cap/ 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.4 2.8 
10A3 kWh/cap. 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.7 1.1 2.0 2.6 4.8 6.2 
tc.e./10A3 $(GNP) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 
kwh/$ (GNP) 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 
Africa south to Sahara 
10A3 $(GNP)/cap. 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 2.3 5 
. . - 
t c.e./cap. 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.6 3.1 
10A3 kWh/cap. 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.9 2.6 5.8 
tc.e./10A3 $(GNP) 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 
kwh/$ (GNP) 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.2 
South Asia 
10A3 $(GNP)/cap. 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.1 2.2 
t c.e./cap. 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.3 2.0 
10A3 kWh/cap. 0.04 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.9 2.1 3.7 
tc.e./10A3 $(GNP) 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.9 
kwh/$ (GNP) 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.9 1.7 
South-East Asia 
10A3 $(GNP)/cap. 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.6 2.1 4.2 8.7 
kwh/$ (GNP) 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.9 
Latin America 
10A3 $(GNP)/cap. 1.2 1.6 2.3 2.6 3.0 3.4 4.3 7.513 
t c.e./cap. 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.5 3.0 
10-3 kWh/cap. 0.3 0.5 1.0 1.2 1.6 2.1 2.9 5.2 6.6 
tc.e./10A3 $(GNP) 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 
kwh/$ (GNP) 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.5 
Socialist Countries 
10A3 $(GNP)/cap. 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.8 2.4 5.310 
t c.e./cap. 0.8 1.7 2.3 2.9 3.4 3.9 4.2 4.8 5.0 
10A3 kWh/cap. 0.5 0.9 1.4 2.2 3.4 4.8 5.9 8.4 9.7 
tc.e./10A3 $(GNP) 3.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.2 1.7 0.9 0.5 
kwh/$ (GNP) 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.4 1.6 0.9 
................................................................. 
B) Enhanced Energy Saving Scenario 
Regions Actual data Projections 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2060 
North America 
10A3 $(GNP)/cap. 7.2 9.4 11.6 13.5 15.2 16.6 17.520 22 
t c.e./cap. 7.8 10.8 10.6 10.0 9.5 8.9 8.4 8.0 7.4 
10-3 kWh/cap. 4.7 7.2 9.5 10.7 11.6 13.4 14.5 15.3 15 
t c.e./10A3 $(GNP) 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 
kwh/$ (GNP) 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 
Western Europe 
10A3 $(GNP)/cap. 4.7 6.9 8.6 10.5 12.8 15 16 20 22 
t c.e./cap. 2.2 3.4 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.4 
10A3 kWh/cap. 1.7 3.0 4.3 5.0 5.7 6.4 6.9 8.8 8.2 
tc.e./10A3 $(GNP) 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 
kwh/$ (GNP) 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Pacific Region 
10A3 $(GNP)/cap. 2.8 6.4 9.0 12.5 16.7 21 23 23 23 
t c.e./cap. 1.3 3.4 3.9 4.2 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.5 3.0 
10A3 kWh/cap. 1.4 3.6 5.2 5.6 6.4 7.3 8.4 8.7 7.6 
t c.e./10A3 $(GNP) 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
kwh/$ (GNP) 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 
North Africa and Middle East 
10A3 $(GNP)/cap. 1.1 2.1 3.1 3.4 4.1 4. 5.5 8 12 
t c.e./cap. 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.2 
10A3 kWh/cap. 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.9 2.4 4.1 4.8 
tc.e./10A3 $(GNP) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 
kwh/$ (GNP) 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 
Africa south to Sahara 
10A3 $(GNP)/cap. 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 2.3 4.8 
tc.e./10A3 $(GNP) 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.3 
kwh/$ (GNP) 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.6 
South Asia 
10A3 $(GNP)/cap. 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.1 2.2 
t c.e./cap. 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.2 
10A3 kWh/cap. 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.6 2.2 
t c.e./10A3 $(GNP) 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.6 
kwh/$ (GNP) 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.0 
South-East Asia 
10A3 $(GNP)/cap. 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.6 2.1 4.2 8.7 
t c.e./cap. 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.6 1.8 
10-3 kWh/cap. 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.2 1.5 2.6 3.4 
t c.e./10A3 $(GNP) 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.2 
kwh/$ (GNP) 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.4 
Latin America 
10A3 $(GNP)/cap. 1.2 1.6 2.3 2.6 3.0 3.2 3.9 6.8 12 
t c.e./cap. 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.9 
10A3 kWh/cap. 0.3 0.5 1.0 1.2 1.6 1.9 2.5 3.8 4.2 
tc.e./10A3 $(GNP) 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 
kwh/$ (GNP) 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.4 
Socialist Countries 
10A3 $(GNP)/cap. 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.8 2.5 5.3 10 
t c.e./cap. 0.8 1.7 2.3 2.9 3.3 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.7 
10A3 kWh/cap. 0.5 0.9 1.4 2.2 3.3 4.4 5.1 6.5 7.3 
tc.e./10A3 $(GNP) 3.7 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.6 2.0 1.5 0.7 0.4 
kwh/$ (GNP) 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.5 2.1 1.2 0.7 
a b l e  3: Energy md electricity dunand projections. 
A )  Base Scenario 
................................................................. 
Regions Actual Data Projections 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2060 
................................................................. 
North America P 1552 2434 2619 2787 2900 2945 2945 2900 2750 
E 940 1640 2355 2955 3555 4450 5370 6100 5700 
Western Europe P 784 1322 1581 1725 1835 1910 1930 1930 1840 
E 602 1176 1800 2220 2780 3335 3860 4650 4420 
Pacific Region P 135 401 529 607 650 670 670 640 570 
E 145 427 696 815 1030 1210 1450 1590 1430 
North Africa P 30 69 155 240 345 445 555 755 940 
and Mid.East E 8 30 114 150 280 540 795 1540 2090 
Africa south P 46 82 142 235 385 615 945 2070 4200 
to Sahara E 30 78 155 235 410 745 1080 3445 7770 
South Asia P 54 89 164 295 505 810 1245 2525 4390 
E 23 73 164 245 505 1030 1740 4210 8120 
South-East Asia P 26 66 158 255 410 630 940 1900 3300 
E 9 37 123 200 380 725 1230 3100 5600 
Latin America P 117 222 416 630 930 1325 1815 2745 3630 
E 69 153 374 555 975 1700 2830 5600 8050 
Soc.Countries P 820 2105 3300 4770 6165 7510 8630 10125 10500 
E 481 1137 2070 3690 6165 9210 12100 17600 20500 
................................................................. 
World (rounded): 
bln. t c.e. 3.56 6.79 9.06 11.5 14.1 17.0 20 25 32 
TWh 2.30 4.73 7.78 11.0 15.9 22.8 30 46 62 
.................................................................. 
B) Enhanced Energy Saving Scenario 
Regions Actual Data Projections 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2060 
................................................................. 
North America P 1552 2434 2619 2750 2810 2810 2780 2670 2500 
E 940 1640 2355 2920 3440 4210 4790 5140 5100 
Western Europe P 784 1322 1581 1725 1815 1850 1850 1795 1660 
E 602 1176 1800 2215 2640 3050 3390 4300 4000 
Pacific Region P 136 401 529 595 620 620 610 550 475 
E 145 428 696 800 970 1115 1325 1370 1200 
North Africa P 31 69 155 240 345 430 510 635 725 
and Mid.East E 8 30 114 150 280 520 730 1295 1600 
Africa south P 46 82 142 235 375 580 825 1435 2130 
to Sahara E 30 78 155 235 400 705 945 2390 3945 
South Asia P 54 89 164 295 485 750 1070 1855 2650 
E 23 73 164 245 490 950 1500 3100 4900 
South-East Asia P 26 66 158 255 395 565 745 1100 1345 
E 9 37 123 200 365 645 975 1800 2300 
Latin America P 117 222 416 625 930 1225 1535 2025 2300 
E 69 153 374 555 975 1575 2400 4125 5170 
8oc.Countries P 820 2105 3300 4770 6045 6945 7520 7830 7830 
B 481 1137 8067 3695 6045 8515 10530 13625 15365 
................................................................. 
World (rounded): 
bln. t c.e. 3.56 6.79 9.06 11.5 13.7 15 17 20 2 1 
TWH 2.30 4.73 7.78 10.9 15.4 21.0 26 36 42 
................................................................. 
Note: P - primary energy consumption, mln. t c.e. 
E - electricity generation, TWh. 
global problems and political tensions, for which solutions should be found now to prevent 
critical situations in the future. 
The absolute levels of primary energy demand in socialist and developing countries will sys- 
tematically grow, although it is quite possible that energy demand in developed countries 
could stabilize by the beginning of the next century. After several decades of stabilization, 
this tendency is likely to be replaced by an absolute reduction in energy demand in the 
regions of developed countries. Per capita primary energy demand in developed countries, 
after reaching a maximal level of 5.9-6.0 tce/cap beginning in the next century, will start 
to decline to 4.5-5.0 tce/cap in the second half of the next century. Per capita demand in 
developing countries will increase from 0.6 tce/cap in the mid-1980s to 1.7-3.0 tce until 
2060; this will be much lower than in developed countries and far from the saturation level. 
Average energy consumption in socialist countries will grow from the present 2.9 tce/cap 
to 3.7-5.0 tce in 2060 and will be practically equal to that of developed countries. 
Electricity generation will increase with growth rates higher than that of total primary 
energy demand. Electricity generation in the world as a whole will grow by a factor of 2.0 
until 2000, a factor of 1.7-1.9 by 2000-2020, and a factor of 1.6-2.2 by 2020-2060 (from 
7.8 TWh in 1980 to 15-16 TWh in 2000, 25-30 TWh in 2020, and 40-60 TWh in 2060, 
the upper levels refer to the scenario excluding enhanced energy-conservation measures). 
Therefore, global primary energy demand is expected to increase two to three times, depend- 
ing on the future energy-conservation scale implemented. These energy demand levels turn out 
to  be much lower than those projected in the early 1980s, when energy savings were treated with 
less attention and assumed much higher inertia in the reconstruction of energy systems. It is 
quite possible that this projection also overestimates the energy demand levels (especially for the 
base scenario). More radical energy demand projections even today [see, for example, Lovins 
et al. (1981)l foresee the technical availability (but not economically valid) to  reduce global 
primary energy demand in the year 2020 to  that of the mid-1980 level. However, such marginal 
projections are seen as illustrations of the capabilities of technological progress achieved until 
now, rather than reflect the real social and economic situation of the world. 
4.4 Projections of Global Primary Energy Supply 
The primary energy production structure will depend heavily on the ways and options of global 
energy systems development. The following approach is used in this study: first, the assumptions 
of the future contribution of renewable energies are considered on the basis of some assessments 
of renewable energy potentials; then nuclear energy input is calculated based on the scenario 
assumptions of nuclear penetration; finally the rest is met by fossil fuels, taking into account 
t h&r resources and technical, economical, and ecological attractiveness. 
Renewable energy potentials (feasible from technical and economic points of view) and as- 
sumptions of their utilization at the end of 2060 are presented in Table 4 [3]. The table shows 
that the total potential of renewables is calculated at about 20 billion tce per year. By 2060, 
the rates of utilization of the potential is assumed as follows: for the business-as-usual scenario 
(without any control measures) 25%, and for all other ecenarios (with some special regulations) 
50% (today this rate does not exceed 4% to  5%). 
For nuclear energy, the following assumptions are used in scenarios: for business-as-usual 
options, 20% to 25% of the world energy demand by 2060 is met by this energy source; in 
nuclear moratorium options, 7% (the 2010 level); in nuclear elimination options, 0; and in fossil 
fuels limitation options, 25% to 40% (depending on the scenario). 
Possible assessments for meeting global energy demand for the above scenarios are presented 
in Table 5. 
Under normal technological progress in the energy sector, and without special measures or 
restrictions to regulate primary energy consumption or mix, it is expected that fossil fuels' share 
Table 4: Renewable energy potential md its utilization 
................................................................. 
Bln.tce/year % utilization in 2060 
low high 
................................................................ 
Organic ~astesl) 4.4 30 6 7  
Solar photovoltaics3) 9 . 0  15 30 
Solar collectors') 2.8 20 4 0  
Total (approxim.) 20 2 5 50 
Kotes: 1 )  Goldemberg J .  et al., 1985.  
2) Haefele K . ,  1 9 8 1 .  
31 Assuming that 2% of the global desert area is covered 
with photovoltaics arrays. 
4) Assuming that 5 m2 of solar collectors per inhabitant 
with an average energy saving about 70 kg ce/m2/j-ear 
are used and 8  bln. of population. 
'Ilble 5: Primary emrgy mix (billion tce/year). 
................................................................. 
Options 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2060 
................................................................. 
A )  Base Scenario 9.06 11.5 14 17 20 25 32 
- business-as-usual 
coal 2.63 3.3 4.2 5.3 6.2 7.7 9.9 
oil 3.90 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.5 4.2 
natural gas 1.72 2.5 3.2 4.1 4.4 4.5 4.8 
nuclear 0.23 0.6 1.1 1.7 2.8 5.0 8.0 
other 0.58 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.2 3.3 5.1 
- nuclear moratorium 
.coal 2.63 3.3 4.2 5.1 6.2 8.2 10.6 
oil 3.90 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.5 4.2 
natural gas 1.72 2.5 3.2 4.1 4.8 5.0 5.1 
nuclear 0.23 0.6 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.8 2.2 
other 0 . 5 8  1.0 1.4 2.2 3.0 5.5 9.9 
- nuclear reduction 
coal 2.63 3.3 4.3 5.3 6.6 9.5 12.8 
oil 3.9 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.5 4.2 
natural gas 1.72 2.5 3.1 4.1 4.8 5.0 5.1 
nuclear 0.23 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 
other 0.58 1.0 1.4 2.2 3.0 5.5 9.9 
- fossil fuel reduction 
coal 2.63 3.3 4.1 4.4 4.2 3.3 2.2 
oil 3.90 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.0 2.2 
natural gas 1.72 2.5 3.1 3.9 -1.6 4.8 1.5 
nuclear 0.23 0.6 1.3 2.2 4.0 7.4 13.1 
other 0.58 1.0 1.4 2.2 3.0 5.5 10.0 
BIEnhanced Energy 9 - 0 6  11.5 13.4 15 17 20 2 1 
Saving Scenario 
- business-as-usual 
coal 2.63 3.3 4.1 4.4 4.6 5.2 5.3 
oil 3.90 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.9 4.0 3.2 
natural gas 1.72 2.5 3.0 3.3 3.9 4.0 3.4 
nuclear 0.23 0.6 1.1 1.5 2.0 2 , 8  4.1 
other 0.58 0.9 1.1 1.8 2.6 4.0 5.0 
- nuclear moratorium 
coal 2.63 3.3 4.1 4.5 1.8 4.6 3.2 
oil 3.90 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.6 2.9 
natural gas 1.72 2.5 3.0 3.3 3.9 4.2 3.8 
nuclear 0.23 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5 
other 0.58 0.9 1.5 2.1 3.2 6.2 9.6 
- nuclear reduction 
coal 2.63 3.3 4.1 3.4 4.9 5.6 4 . . l  
oil 3.90 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.0 3.6 2.9 
natural gas 1.72 2.5 3.0 3.5 3.0 4.2 3.8 
nuclear 0.23 0.6 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.4 0.0 
other 0.58 1.0 1.5 2.2 3.3 6.2 9.9 
- fossil fuel reduction 
coal 2.63 3.3 4.1 4.0 3.4 2.1 1.5 
oil 3.90 4.1 4.1 3.9 3.1 2.6 1.1 
natural gas 1.72 2.5 3.0 3.5 3.7 4.0 3.1 
nuclear 0.23 0.6 1.0 1.3 3.4 4.8 5.1 
other 0.58 1.0 1.5 2.3 3.2 6.2 9.9 
................................................................. 
will go down from the present 87% to  56%-59% by the end of the projection period. Coal 
production will increase to  5.5-9.9 billion tce annually (though its share in the global energy 
balance will change from 29% to  25% in the enhanced energy-conservation scenario and to  31% 
in the base case scenario). Crude oil production will remain a t  the level of 3.3-4.2 million tce 
(2.3-2.9 billion tons) by the end of the period, and its share will decrease sharply from 36% to  
13%-15%. The peak of global crude oil production is expected between 2000 and 2010 (in the 
enhanced energy-savings scenario) or 2040 (in the base case scenario). Natural gas production 
will reach 3.5-4.8 billion tce (2.9-4.0 trillion m3) with its share going down from 22% to 15%- 
16%. Nuclear energy production will systematically grow in all options except nuclear reduction, 
supplying almost 20%-25% of the global energy demand until 2060, and the renewable energy 
share will increase to  16%-24%, depending on the scenario. 
In the scenarios with delayed global warming, fossil fuels consumption is strongly reduced 
(down to  28% in 2060), due to  the intensive development of non-carbon energy technologies 
(e.g., nuclear and renewables). Simultaneously, a decline of the absolute consumption of fossil 
fuels will take place, especially in the enhanced conservation scenarios. The most remarkable 
reduction will be expected for c d  and crude oil the shares of each decreasing to 7%. The share 
of natural gas will be between 14%-16%. Nonfossil eneregy sources will produce over 70% of 
the primary energy by the end of the projection period; the share of renewable energies will be 
30%-45%. 
In the scenarios with limited nuclear energy (moratorium or even reduction), it is assumed 
that in the near future (15 to  20 years) nuclear energy production will still increase because 
nuclear power plants now under construction will be operating. After 2010, the nuclear program 
might stabilize at  the achieved level (approximately 7% in the nuclear moratorium scenario) or 
decrease to  zero until 2060 (in the nuclear reduction scenario). In the former case, nuclear energy 
will be able to contribute 1.5-2.2 billion tce (the low level for the enhanced energy-conservation 
scenario and the high level for the base case scenario). Naturally, such severe restrictions on 
nuclear energy development will be followed by higher production of fossil fuels. In this case the 
fossil fuels share will reduce only to  47%-62% as compared to the present 87%, but the absolute 
volumes of fossil fuels production will practically decline to today's level after reaching its peak 
between 2010 and 2020 in the enhanced energy-conservation scenario or continue to  grow by 
almost two times in the base case scenario. 
4.5 Fossil Fuel Resources in the 21st Century 
Table 6 shows an assessment of the expected cumulative use of global fossil fuel resources from 
1980 to  2060. As can be seen from the table, under moderate energy-savings efforts (base 
scenario) large shares of conventional crude oil and natural gas will be extracted until the 
end of the projection period, and there will be needs for developing unconventional hydrocarbon 
resources (for crude oil: oil shales, heavy oils, oil sands, synthetic crude from coal; for naturnl gas: 
gas from tight formations, geopressure zones, gas hydrates, substitute natural gas from coal). 
For coal resources, the exhaustion rate will remain very low even for economically recoverable 
coal resources (less than 15%). In the enhanced energy-savings scenarios, the level of fossil fuel 
resources utilization will be 15%-20% lower. 
In total, it should be pointed out that even in the limited fossil fuels use scenarios the wide- 
scale production of unconventional crude oil should start circa 2025, and in some countries the 
same will be true for natural gas. This means that within that time period the technologies 
for liquid and gaseous synthetic hydrocarbon production, including coal conversion, should be 
tested and put on on line. 
................................................................ 
Coal Oil Natural gas 
Scenarios (bln. t c.e.) (bln. t) (trln.m3 1 
1) Base Scenario: 
- business-as-usual 495 
- nuclear moratorium 5 1 0  
- nuclear reduction 5 6 5  
- fossil fuel reduction 285 
2) Enhanced Energy Saving 
Scenario : 
- business-as-usual 3 6 5  
- nuclear moratorium 3 3 2  
- nuclear reduction 3 6 5  
- fossil fuel reduction 245 
Notes: Coal recoverable resources - 3 5 0 0  bln. t c.e. 
conventional crude oil - 2 5 7  bln. t .  
conventional natural gas - 295 trln.mJ 
(Energy in a Finite World. Paths to a Sustainable Future, 
K.Haefele, Program Leader, Ballinger Publishing Co., CamL- 
ridge, Mass., 1981) 
4.6 C02 Emissions by Energy Systems 
The analysis of C02  emissions caused by burning fossil fuels and processing in energy technolo- 
gies and installations and related climate changes due to the greenhouse effect is an essential 
element of energy forecasting. 
C02  emission assessments of concentrations in the atmosphere were carried out on the basis of 
cumulative carbon release calculations for the primary energy mix scenarios for different future 
energy system developments (Table 7). It is assumed that only 60% of the carbon released 
remains in the atmosphere (the rest is absorbed by the oceans). According to  some observations 
of C02  concentrations in the atmosphere from 1960 to 1970 and assessments of cumulative 
consumption of fossil fuels, it follows that about 40% of the anthropogenic carbon remained in 
the atmosphere. However, more accurate observations from 1959 to 1973 show that the share of 
carbon remaining in the atmosphere was equal to about 56% (see National Academy of Sciences, 
1977). Many modeling approaches assume the share to  be 60% (see, for example, Rogers, 1990). 
The same assumption is also applied in this study. The COz absorption rate depends on many 
factors, of which the main ones are temperature gradient and biomass expansion. Edmonds and 
RRilly (1983), for example, use a different airborne ratio for atmospheric C 0 2  concentration, 
ranging from 40% to 70%. 
The following C 0 2  outputs were used for C02  emissions (in tons of C02  per 1 ton of tce): for 
coal, 3.0; oil, 2.3; and natural gas, 1.5 (Deutscher Bundestag, 1988). The results of calculations 
are given in Table 7. Analysis of the results with C 0 2  emission shows that in spite of remarkable 
efforts in energy conservation and changes in the primary energy mix (enhanced energy-savings 
and limited fossil fuels scenarios), there are still no fundamental changes in C 0 2  releases com- 
bined with a reduced atmospheric concentration during the whole period under consideration. 
Of course, this cannot be achieved in the next 15 to 20 years as it was recommended by the 
1988 Toronto Protocol with the goal to reduce C02 emissions by 20% by 2005. Moreover, first 
signs of an effective C 0 2  reduction policy will only start to be noticeable after 2010. 
Restricting the use of nuclear energy will naturally result in a substantial growth of C 0 2  
concentrations (by a factor of 1.5 to 1.6) as compared with the fossil fuels limitations option in 
which C 0 2  concentrations growth will be minimal (only by a factor of 1.3 to 1.4). However, if one 
assumes that the C02  contribution to total global warming will remain close to 50% during the 
whole period (this ratio exists now and will most likely stay unchanged in the future), then by 
2060 a doubling of total atmospheric C02 concentrations is expected. More distinct differences 
in global energy development scenarios should be expected beyond the projection period. 
Results of C02  concentration forecasts show that, although C02  accumulation in the at- 
mosphere will take place during the whole period, the concentration growth could, however, 
essentially slow down if a reasonable policy of energy conservation and reduced fossil fuels use 
is followed. The negative impacts of global warming might substantially reduce with an active 
policy of reforestation parallel to C 0 2  abatement measures. 
Rough estimates show that increasing the forestal areas of the world by 40% [4] until 2060 
could reduce atmospheric C 0 2  concentration growth by almost 255 bln. t C (Table 8),  and 
with reduced fossil fuels use and enhanced energy savings it could substantially compensate the 
expected C 0 2  release from fossil fuel burning over the projected period. 
Despite the fact that these are very simplified calculations, the effects of enforced reforesta- 
tion depend on the scenarios applied: practically eliminating the negative impacts produced by 
fossil fuels and delaying global warming or only somewhat compensating for global warming. 
This means that energy conservation coupled with reforestation should be considered as primary 
measures for C02  abatement. 
'hble 7: Coo Pro&tionr by energy wurces (billion tons). 
A )  Base Scenario 
................................................................. 
Options 1 9 8 0  1 9 9 0  2 0 0 0  2 0 1 0  2 0 2 0  2 0 4 0  2 0 6 0  Total 
................................................................. 
Business-as-Usual 
Total releases 0  5 3 . 4  6 3 . 0  7 3 . 5  8 3 . 8  1 9 3 . 2  2 2 1 . 2  6 8 8 . 2  
Remaining in the atm. 0  3 2 . 1  3 7 . 8  4 4 . 1  5 0 . 3  1 1 5 . 9  1 3 2 . 7  3 1 2 . 9  
Concentration, ppm 3 4 0  3 5 5  3 7 3  3 9 5  4 1 7  4 7 0  5 3 5  
Kuclear Moratorium 
Total releases 0  5 3 . 4  6 3 . 0  7 3 . 5  8 5 . 0  2 0 1 . 7  2 3 3 . 1  7 0 9 . 5  
Remaining in the atm. 0  3 2 . 1  3 7 . 8  4 4 . 0  5 1 . 0  1 2 1 . 0  1 3 9 . 8  4 2 5 . 7  
Concentration, ppm 3 4 0  ' 3 5 5  3 7 3  3 9 4  4 1 7  4 7 5  5 1 0  
Kuclear Reduction 
Total releases 0  5 3 . 5  6 3 . 3  7 1 . 3  8 '7 .1  2 1 4 . 5  2 5 9 . 6  7 5 2 . 1  
Remaining in the atm. 0  3 2 . 1  3 8 . 0  4 4 . 6  5 2 . 3  1 2 8 . 7  1 5 5 . 8  1 5 1 . 3  
Concentration,ppm 3 4 0  3 5 5  3 7 5  3 9 4  1 1 9  1 8 0  5 5 3  
Fossil Fuel Reduction 
Total releases 0  5 3 . 5  6 2 . 2  6 9 . 2  7 2 . 6  1 4 0 . 7  1 1 4 . 3  5 1 2 . 4  
Remaining in the atm. 0  3 2 . 1  3 7 . 3  4 1 . 5  4 3 . 5  8 4 . 4  6 8 . 6  3 0 7 . 4  
Concentration, ppm 3 4 0  3 5 5  3 7 5  3 9 2  1 1 2  1 5 3  1 8 5  
................................................................ 
B )  Enhanced Energy Saving Scenario 
................................................................. 
Options 1 9 8 0  1 9 9 0  2 0 0 0  2 0 1 0  2 0 2 0  2 0 1 0  2 0 6 0  Total 
Business-as-Usual 
Total releases 0  5 3 . 4  6 2 . 7  7 0 . 2  7 2 . 1  1 1 8 . 6  1 5 0 . 1  5 5 7 . 7  
Remaining in the atm. 0  3 2 . 1  3 7 . 7  4 2 . 1  1 3 . 4  8 9 . 1  9 0 . 3  3 3 1 . 6  
Concentration,ppm 3 4 0  3 5 5  3 7 3  3 9 3  1 1 3  1 5 5  5 0 0  
Kuclear Moratorium 
Total releases 0  5 3 . 4  6 2 . 7  7 0 . 2  7 3 . 0  1 1 3 . 8  1 2 8 . 3  5 3 1 . 1  
Remaining in the atm. 0  3 2 . 1  3 7 . 7  4 2 . 1  4 3 . 8  8 6 . 3  7 7 . 0  3 1 8 . 8  
Concentration,ppm 3 4 0  3 5 5  3 7 3  3 9 3  1 1 3  4 5 1  1 9 0  
Kuclear Reduction 
Total releases 
Remaining in the atm. 0  3 2 . 1  3 7 . 7  4 2 . 2  4 4 . 5  9 2 . 0  8 7 . 4  3 1 8 . 8  
Concentration,ppm 3 4 0  3 5 5  3 7 3  3 9 3  4 1 4  4 5 7  5 0 0  
Fossil Fuel Reduction 
Total releases 0  5 3 . 4  6 2 . 8  6 8 . 7  6 3 . 6  1 0 5 . 1  7 9 . 0  4 3 2 . 6  
Remaining in the atm. 0  3 2 . 1  3 7 . 7  4 1 . 4  3 8 . 2  6 3 . 0  4 7 . 4  2 5 9 . 5  
Concentration, ppm 3 4 0  3 5 5  3 7 3  3 9 2  4 1 0  4 4 0  4 6 2  
'hble 8: Effect of reforestation on C02 reductions. 
................................................................. 
% Reforestat- Yln. ha C02 absorbed 
ed (b1n.t C )  
.................................................................. 
Total 2 5 4 
Sote: ?laxima1 area of reforestation = 2000 mln.ha ( 2 3 %  of the 
global forest-free area) 
Average biomass growth rate = 6.85 t/ha/pr 
Average growth time = 20 years 
5 Comparative Analysis of Global Long-Term Energy/ 
C02 Studies 
Recently, long-term energy projections have become an essential part of global economic and 
social planning because of the long lead times of new energy technologies' penetration and 
their high capital intensities. Several years ago the long-term approach t o  energy projections 
was stressed. At that time it was discovered that increasing amounts of atmospheric COz 
concentrations were causing global warming; atmospheric C 0 2  concentrations to a large extent 
are caused by fossil fuels use. For this reason global, long-term energy projections are again the 
focus of many research studies being carried out over recent years. 
There is a multitude of global, long-term energy projections published worldwide. Most 
appeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and a new wave occurred in the late 19806, when 
the threat of global warming started to  be considered a real and serious global problem. These 
studies use different assumptions, methodological approaches, and time periods and are based 
on different sets of input data: global/regional economic and population growth, costs and 
efficiencies of energy technologies evaluations, availability of conventional and renewable energy 
sources, and so on. Strictly speaking, the diverse features of these studies makes comparisons 
practically impossible. Here we will attempt to analyze the quantitative results of a few selected 
studies without trying to  clarify why and how such results came about. Such a simplified 
approach makes it possible to notice the evolution of long-term energy projections over time. 
To review global energy/COz projections, we use original publications as well as summaries 
of global/regional studies presented a t  IIASA's International Energy Workshop in June 1989. 
We have chosen the following studies (in order of their appearance) for further analysis from a 
long list of available publications: 
Nordhaus, W.D., Strategies for the Control of Carbon Dioxide (1977). 
WCG (Working Consulting Group) of the President of the USSR Academy of Sci- 
ences, Long-Term Global Energy Projections, Moscow (1978)(in Russian). 
Colombo, U. and 0. Bernardini, A Low Energy Growth Scenario and the Perspec- 
tives for Western Europe, Report prepared for the Commission of the European 
Communities, Panel on Low Energy Growth (1979). 
Rotty, R. and G. Harland, Constraints on Carbon Dioxide Production from Fossil 
Fuels Use (1980). 
Hiifele, W. et al., Energy in a Finite World: A Global Systems Analysis. Report 
by the Energy Systems Program of the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis. Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger (1981). 
Lovins, A., L. Lovins, F. Krause, and F. Bach, Energy Strategies for Low Climatic 
Risk. Report to  the German Federal Environment Agency (1981). 
Nordhaus, W. and G. Yohe, Future Paths of Energy and Carbon Dioxide Emis- 
eion. In Changing Climate, Report of the Carbon Dioxide Assessment Committee. 
Washington, DC: National Academy Press (1983). 
Edmonds, J. and J. Reilly, A Long-Term Global Energy-Economic Model of Carbon 
Dioxide Release from Fossil Fuel Use. Energy Economist 5:74-88 (1983). 
Rose, D., M. Miller, and C. Agnew, Global Energy Futures and COz-Induced Cli- 
matic Change. Report MITEL 83-015. Cambridge, Mass. (1983). 
Goldemberg, J., T. Johansson, A. Reddy, and R. Williams, An End-Use Oriented 
Global Energy Strategy. Annual Review of Energy 10:613-688 (1985). 
Edmonds, J. and J. Reilly, Global Energy: Assessing the Futum. New York: Oxford 
(1985). 
F'risch, J .-R., Long-Term Energy Alternatives to  Hydrocarbons, Presented at the 
12th World Petroleum Congress, Houston, TX (1987). 
AMOCO Corporation, Lower and Upper Price Cases, Presented at the International 
Energy Workshop, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria, June (1989). 
Centre for International Energy Studies, Erasmus University, High, Low, and Mid- 
Point Demand Growth, Presented at  the International Energy Workshop, IIASA, 
Laxenburg, Austria, June (1989). 
Ashby, A. and D. Dreyfus, Global Outlook for Service Sector Energy Requirements, 
Presented a t  the International Energy Workshop, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria, June 
(1989). 
14th Congress of the World Energy Conference. Conservation and Studies Commit- 
tee, World Energy Horizons 2000-2020, Paris (1989). 
Hlifele, W., Energy Systems Under Stress, Invited paper, 14th World Energy Con- 
ference, September 1989. 
Starr, C. and M. Searl, Global Projections of Energy and Electricity. American 
Power Conference, Annual Meeting, Chicago, Ill., April (1989). 
Sinyak, Y., Global Energy/COz Projections, Unpublished report, IIASA, Laxenburg, 
Austria (1990). 
US EPA and US DOE, Atmospheric Stabilization F'ramework (1990). 
F'rom a methodological viewpoint, these studies can be divided into four groups: 
1. Studies based on reasonable judgments and assumptions without the application of math- 
ematical models and tools or detailed calculations [see, for example Hafele (1989)l. 
2. Studies with collective views based on initial assumptions and an iterative process of 
finding a consensus. (A good example of such an approach is the study prepared for the 
14th World Energy Conference by a group of experts with Dr. J.-R. F'risch as Project 
Director. An extensive information exchange between experts and the central team was 
used to  produce final, consistent results.) 
3. Studies directed at  the detailed analysis of energy end-consumers and assessments of effi- 
ciencies of new energy technologies, using a normative approach to  global energy problems 
[see, Goldemberg et al. (1985) and Lovins et al. (1981)l. 
4. Studies with modeling approaches for solving global energy problems - from simplified 
models of energy/economy interactions [WCG (1978) and Sinyak (1990)l t o  complicated 
sets of mathematical optimization models [Hifele et al. (1981) or Rotty and Harland (1980)l 
to  complex computer modeling systems using simulation procedures (Edmonds and Reilly, 
1985). 
The analysis of available studies shows that the majority of the projections predict a further 
growth in global energy demand ( Table 9), but several prognoses deviate from this overall trend: 
Goldemberg et al. (1985), for example, assume an energy demand stabilization until 2020, Lovins 
et al. (1981) are convinced that global energy demand could even be reduced to  early 1980 levels 
by the year 2030. 
It is interesting to  see the evolution of projections. The average global energy demand esti- 
mate in 200 pre-1985 studies is equal t o  17 billion tce annually, whereas after 1985 the average 
estimate is already remarkably lower: only 13 billion tce. The same trend but with pronounced 
deviations downward can be seen for subsequent time periods: the average estimate of pre-1985 
studies for 2025 is above 25 billion tce as compared with only 17 billion tce estimated in studies 
Table 9: World energy demand projections (billion tce). 
Reference 2020- 2030- 2050- 
Sources 2000 2010 2030 2040 2060 
WCG (1978) 18.3-21.2 30.9-38.3 43-55 
Colombo and Bernardini (1979) 15.4 
Hiifele et al. (1981) 
(Low scenario) 15.8 23.5 
Lovins et al. (1981) 5.5 
Nordhaus and Yohe (1983) 26.2 
Edmonds and RRilly (1983) 20.2-28.5 
Rose et al. (1983) 12.9-19.4 
Goldemberg et al. (1985) 12.0 
Edmonds and M y  (1985) 16.5 31.3 
Center for International 
Energy Studies, Erasmus 
University (1988) 20.8-23.4 
F'risch (1987) 12.0 17.1 23.2 27.7 31.8 
AMOCO (1989) 19.2-19.5 
Ashby and Dreyfus (1989) 18.6 
WEC-14 (1989) 13.6-14.7 16.5-19.3 
Starr and Sear1 (1989) 18.4-29.2 
Sinyak (1990) 13.7-14.1 17.1-20.0 20.0-25.0 21.0-32.0 
US EPA/DOE (1990) 18.2 17.0-23.0 
conducted after 1985. Even more striking is the reduction in global energy-demand assessments 
for the middle of next century: about 50 billion tce for 2050 in pre-1985 studies as compared 
with 25 to 27 billion tce for 2060 in studies published after 1985. All these changes indicate a 
drastic shift to assessing the role future energy systems will play and to using the huge energy 
conservation potential that exists in all economic sectors of developed and developing countries. 
It  has become evident that energy savings are real long-term factors in energy systems develop- 
ment which provide further economic growth with minimal risks to the environment, mankind, 
and resource exhaustion and, moreover, with less capital and operation and maintenance costs. 
Most interesting is the comparison of three studies: Sinyak (1990); Edmonds and Reilly 
(1985); and F'risch (1987). All of them have almost the same time horizon; deal with global/ 
regional aspects of energy demand evolution; and, moreover, consider energy demand not only 
in total but by primary energy forms. Furthermore, they try to  link energy systems development 
to  global climate changes resulting from increased C 0 2  concentrations. 
The projections show a steady growth in global energy demand until the middle of the next 
century but with different growth rates. According to  WEC-14 projections, annual growth rates 
will decline from 1.5% in 2000-2020 to  0.7% in 2040-2060. Edmonds and M y  (1985) assume 
rather high annual growth rates for primary energy demand during the first half of the next 
century (2.5% per year), which result in an overestimation of primary energy demand and COz 
emissions. 
Concerning the different primary energy demand forms, there are large discrepancies among 
the different projections (Table 10). Edmonds and Reilly (1985) expect a doubling of crude oil 
production from 2000 to  2050, reaching 10.2 billion tce (more than 7 billion toe), including un- 
conventional liquid fuels resources like oil shales, heavy oils but without synthetic oils produced 
from coal. According to  projections by F'risch (1987), global crude oil production will reach its 
peak in 2000 and then will slightly decrease until 2060. Projections by Sinyak (1990) assume a 
sharp reduction in crude oil production in case of regulatory constraints of strategies directed 
t o  a delay in global warming, and a stabilization over the whole period if the consequences of 
global warming turn out t o  be less severe and no special regulations are applied. The magnitude 
of existing crude oil projections can be explained by the different treatment of unconventional 
oil resources in the studies. For example, Edmonds and Reilly (1985) assume that twethirds of 
the crude oil production in 2050 will be from unconventional sources with lower costs than in 
the case of synthetic oils production from coal. 
Just the opposite is the case with natural gas production. According to  Edmonds and 
Reilly (1985), after 2025 natural gas demand will decline because of the rapid exhaustion of 
conventional natural gas resources which will be replaced at  a very slow pace by unconventional 
resources with extraction costs much higher than that of substitute natural gas production from 
coal. F'risch (1987) assumes a steady growth in natural gas production until 2060. Sinyak's 
(1990) projections support Edmonds and Reilly's projections and F'risch's projections: with 
minimal fossil fuel consumption (limited fossil fuels use options) they are close t o  Edmonds and 
Reilly's projections; with maximal fossil fuels use, they are close t o  the projections of F'risch 
(nuclear moratorium or nuclear reductions options). 
The situation of coal prospects remains very uncertain. It is quite evident that in the case 
of restrictions for fossil fuel consumption, because of the many environmental, economic, and 
societal factors, the use of coal has t o  decline. If nuclear energy, in turn, is constrained or 
substantially reduced, then only coal will be able t o  fill the gap in expected primary energy 
demand which will be followed by increased C 0 2  emissions. Therefore, depending on initial 
assumptions, the long-term coal projections could differ by an order of magnitude. Coal's share 
(including biomass) is, according to  Edmonds and Reilly (1985), a t  the highest level in 2050 
(45%), with coal production of more than 25 million tce (almost eight times more than in the 
mid-1980s). They assume that after 2025 synthetic liquids and gaseous fuels from coal will vastly 
expand, and according t o  their estimates one-third of the coal produced will be used for this 
purpose. Meanwhile, the synfuels from coal have ever higher C 0 2  emissions per unit of energy 
than those produced by liquid gaseous fuels from natural sources (e.g., three times more than 
that for natural gas). 
Assessments of the future role of nuclear energy show the biggest deviations. Edmonds and 
Reilly's projections for 2050 are almost three times that of F'risch's but very dose t o  the level 
predicted in Sinyak's limited fossil fuels use option in the base scenario. However, this level 
could be reduced by half in the case of enhanced energy saving accompanied by global-warming 
regulations. Edmonds and Reilly build their projections on the assumption of a higher economic 
efficiency for nuclear energy together with growing crude oil and natural gas prices and far- 
reaching consequences of environmental pollution. They predict a 5.6% growth rate for nuclear 
energy between 2000 and 2025 and 3.4% between 2025 and 2050. But they could not account 
for the consequences of Chernobyl and the resulting negative public opinion for nuclear energy. 
This is the main reason for their overestimates in nuclear projections. At the same time it is 
necessary t o  understand that without nuclear energy the global-warming problem can hardly 
be solved in the next century, even with enhanced energy-savings policies. This position is also 
supported by the World Energy Conference (WEC, 1989), HZele (1989), and many others. 
The future role of renewable energy sources is in all studies evaluated as modest, although 
the absolute volume of this energy form will increase by several factors. Only Sinyak (1990) 
projects the share of renewables t o  be a t  a very high level (maybe even too high!) in the limited 
fossil fuels use scenarios. 
In summary, one could point out some common tendencies in energy systems development 
concerning energy demand growth, conventional crude oil and natural gas resources exhaustion, 
production of unconventional crude oil, and, t o  a lesser extent, unconventional gas production 
and the penetration of nuclear and renewable energy sources in the global energy balance. 
However, the future structure of primary energy supply and production levels of different energy 
forms remains very uncertain, which shows that further research in this field in necessary. 
Table 10. World energy supply by energy sources (billion tce). 
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"Including biomass. 
In recent projections, many authors consider C 0 2  emissions as the major element in ex- 
pected global warming. First, burning fossil fuels to provide society with useful energy forms 
produces large quantities of C 0 2  released into the atmosphere. Second, C 0 2  emissions and their 
related global-warming effect have a global character unlike many other air pollutants with only 
regional/local impacts. Third, the negative consequences of global warming might be noticed 
Boon (within the next decades: the lifetime of energy equipment built now). All this makes the 
C 0 2  problem an essential element of global energy projections. 
Many studies forecast a steady increase in global C02  emissions (see again Table 10). How- 
ever, a few projections predict reductions in C 0 2  emissions: for example, Rotmans et al. (1989) 
show that annual C 0 2  emissions could be reduced by a factor of two by 2050 as compared with 
today'e levels.[5] The dynamics of this indicator provides two distinct periods: the f i s t  from 
2020 to  2025, when the majority of projections expect modest growth, and the eecond after 2025, 
when a sharp growth occurs because of changes in primary energy mix connected to  the higher 
use of coal for synthetic fuel production as well as to high levels of crude oil production from oil 
shales, both of which are accompanied with high COz emissions. The diverging C 0 2  emission 
assessments in the studies can be explained by the different evaluations of specific emissions 
caused by burning fossil fuels. 
When calculating C 0 2  concentrations in the atmosphere, many studies use different assess- 
ments of the share remaining in the atmosphere after part of the C 0 2  is absorbed by the oceans. 
This share ranges from 40% to  70% (naturally, the wide magnitude of estimates produced highly 
different results). The expected C 0 2  emissions are shown in Table 11. 
Table 11: Expected annual C 0 2  emissions (billion C/yr). 
Reference 2020- 2030- 2050- 
Sources 1985 2000 2030 2040 2060 
Nordhaus (1977) 11 18" 40 45 
Rotty and Harland (1980) 9 13 15 
Htifele et al. (1981) 9 16 
Edmonds and Reilly (1985) 5.5 6.9 12.3 26.3 
Lashof (1989) 5.4" 6-1 1" 7-15" 
EPA (1989) 5-1 1 4-18 
Rotmans et al. (1989) 4-7" 4-13" 3-21" 
Sinyak (1990) 6.2-6.3 6-8 5-1 1 4-13 
WEC-14 (1989) 7.2 9.1 8-10 11-14 
Hafele (1989) 6-7 4.1 
US EPA/DOE (1990) 10-13 
'Including other COz murcca besidca foseil fuels m d  other trace gases. 
All studies indicate increasing C 0 2  concentrations until the middle of next century (see 
Table 12), but it will be hardly double that of the preindustrial period. Sinyak (1990) predicts 
increasing C 0 2  concentration levels up to 460-550 ppm by 2060 (this only accounts for burning 
fossil fuels and not for anthropogenic and other natural factors). Rotmans et al. (1989) show 
a possible stabilization of C 0 2  concentrations during the next century if drastic preventive 
measures are initiated immediately to  reduce fossil fuels use and to control other emissions from 
trace gases. 
In conclusion, it is necessary to  note that there are common trends in all studies for fu- 
ture development. But a t  present, differences in numeric results are still significant. These 
differences demand additonal efforts in energy/C02 research with improvements in projection 
methodologies and in studying the causes for global warming (either natural or anthropogenic). 
Table 12: COz concentration projections (ppm). 
Reference 2020- 2030- 
Sources 1985 2000 2030 2040 2050 2060 
Edmonds and Reilly (1985) 380 445 575 
Hiifele et al. (1981) 350-370 410-490 
Minzer (1989) 350-380' 360-490' 400-630' 
Rotmans et al. (1989) 340 360' 370-530' 
Sinyak (1990) 373 410420 440-480 460-550 
WEC-14 (1989) 348 372-377 395-410 423-456 
Haele (1989) 410 440 460 470 475 
'Including C02 sourcea besides fossil fuels and other trace gases. 
6 Conclusions 
1. Energy as a driving force of social and technological progress will keep its leading role 
among major global problems during the 21st century. This calls for necessary and expedi- 
ent elaborations of long-term energy projections. The many forms of energy development, 
uncertainties in input assumptions and parameters, and differences in socio-philosophical 
concepts of societal development explain the diversity in approaches to solving global en- 
ergy problems and periodic reevaluations of long-term forecasts. 
2. Today's energy systems have entered a period of transition from systems based on ex- 
haustible fossil fuels resources to systems based on practically inexhaustible resources 
(nuclear fission and fusion, renewables). The duration of this transition period will de- 
pend on many factors. The main factors certainly are the significance of climatic and 
environmental degradations associated with the different energy systems and technologies 
and the social costs of various energy sources. The global-warming issued could speed up 
the pace of this transition. 
3. The next decades (at least until the middle of the next century) of global energy systems 
development will be characterized by the following: 
Further energy demand growth (mainly in socialist and developing countries). 
Growing importance of energy conservation and savings in all areas of energy pro- 
duction and consumption. 
Severe limitations in nuclear energy development (especially during the next couple 
of decades) until new generations of nuclear reactors are installed with much higher 
safety rates. 
Limited contribution of renewable energy sources to  the global energy balance which 
is due to their unfavorable economics, often negative impacts, and unreliability. 
Fossil fuel will keep its leading role in the global energy supply from the viewpoint of 
resources availability and production costs, although ecological and climatic factors 
will greatly influence its future use. 
The influence of ecological and climatic factors in compiling energy strategies will 
increase, while the impact of political and economic factors, presently dominating 
the energy-related decision-making processes, will decrease. 
4. In light of these anticipated tendencies, global energy demand might increase from the 
current levels of 11.5 to 13-14 billion tce in 2000 and up to 20-30 billion tce in 2060. 
Moreover, energy demand in developed countries will remain stable or even start to decline 
after that period (it is quite probable that the absolute level of energy demand in some 
developed countries will start to decrease in the near future). The largest growth in global 
energy demand will take place in developing countries (including China and other socialist 
countries). The expected energy demand growth in developing countries with market 
economies will be six- to tenfold and in socialist countries 1.7-2.2 times that of mid-1980 
levels. At the same time the share of developing countries with market economies will 
increase from 11.5% in 1980 to  42%-52% in 2060 and the developed countries' share, 
which now exceeds 50%, will decrease to  16%-12% in 2060. Such drastic changes in the 
global energy demand structure indicate the shift of global, energy-related problems to  the 
regions of developing countries in the coming decades. This will be followed by new "hotn 
points in solving global, energy supply problems if reasonable measures are not taken in 
time. 
5. The primary energy supply structure in the next 70 t o  80 years will be strongly depen- 
dent upon the applied energy development strategies. In the business-as-usual scenario 
(without any constraints on fossil fuels or nuclear energy), coal production will increase to  
5-10 billion tce annually until the end of the projection period, conventional crude oil to  
3.2-4.2 billion tce, and natural gas to 3.4-4.8 billion tce. The total share of nuclear and 
renewable energy will reach 40%-45%. However, in the case of the global-warming preven- 
tion strategy, the share of fossil fuels must be substantially reduced (in our assessments 
to  25%-28% in 2060), with coal and crude oil production - because of C 0 2  emissions - 
declining more than natural gas. A freeze or even limits on nuclear energy production 
could only be compensated by a growth in fossil fuels production (of course, parallel to 
enhanced energy savings) by at least 1.4-2.6 times that of today's level, but this will be 
accompanied by a proportional rate of C 0 2  emissions. 
6. In spite of many radical measures that could be taken to  stop the negative impacts on 
the global climate, it is unlikely that increasing atmospheric C 0 2  concentrations can be 
avoided during the period under consideration (the most we can expect is a possible delay 
in global warming for a couple of decades). Parallel to these measures other efforts have 
to  be taken. (First of all intensive global reforestation and reduction of other trace gase 
emissions, which contribute up to  50% to global warming.) Broad-scale investigations on 
the phenomenon of global warming and its consequences must be started, and preventive 
measures must be evaluated in order to choose the optimal strategy for social and economic 
development worldwide. The climate-change issues should be treated as a real and essential 
global problem that requires the collective efforts by all nations looking for the optimal 
path to  global/regional energy development (especially for the next several decades in view 
of the high uncertainty and remote consequences). 
7. The probability and consequences of global warming still remain highly uncertain and 
call for further studies on energy-ecology-climate interaction a t  the global as well as re- 
gional levels. Special attention should be devoted to  elaborate the complex mathematical 
model sets, describing all the aspects of future global warming produced by natural and 
anthropogenic systems (including energy systems), and to  assess the socioeconomic results 
and costs of preventive measures. Therefore, it is imperative to resume a new round of 
global-energy-related studies with new goals and approaches. 
Notes 
[I] This statement may be too optimistic but the acceptance of environmental considerations, 
the understanding of the importance of the risk analysis, and many other factors serve as 
examples of this controversial statement. 
[2] This statement is valid until per capita GNP and energy consumption reach some minimal 
levels ensuring their entering into the group of industrially developed countries. 
[3] In fact, the total potential may be several times more if we assume much higher rates for 
solar energy utilization than those given in Table 6. Therefore, the levels of renewable 
energies utilization assumed in this study should be considered as rather conservative 
which might be several times more in case of special governmental promotions. 
[4] Total global solid area covered with forests of all types is about 75 million km2 today; the 
remaining noncultivated area (savanna, deserts and semideserts, tundra, etc.) spreads over 
more than 60 million km2 (Leemans, 1990). Cultivating one-third of the forest-free area 
will give almost 2000 million hectares of new forests or more than the 25% growth of the 
global forest area. This is hardly an exaggerated assumption if we take into account that 
the Tropical Forestry Action Plan of 1987 identifies the need to  rehabilitate 1.6 million km2 
of forest and woodland for erosion and flood control alone (United Nations Development 
Programme, 1990). Assuming an average productivity of the new forests attributable to 
intensive plantation management at  the level of 3-4 t C/ha/year for moderate latitudes 
and of 6-8 t C/ha/year for wet tropical forests (Marland, 1988) and applying two-thirds 
of the efforts on growing new forests to the tropical zone, we find that over the next 70 
years the total quantity of the carbon absored from the atmosphere will reach about 255 
billion t; this corresponds to  some 50% to 100% of C02  remaining in the atmosphere due 
to burning of fossil fuels. Until now less ambitious programs of reforestation are considered 
(e.g., the IPCC study contemplates only 400 million hectare as a target for C 0 2  reduction 
which could give only 80 million t C over 100 years, (IPCC, 1990). 
[5] The investigation by Rotmans et al. (1989) deserves special attention because it treats 
many factors influencing global warming. 
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